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decide whether to move and pay the migration costs. These costs are assumed to be sunk. 
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migrants by paying them at their expected productivity. The decision of whether to migrate 
or not depends on the proportion of high-skilled workers among the migrants. The migration 
game  exhibits  strategic  complementarities,  which,  because  of  standard  coordination 
problems, lead to multiple equilibria. We characterize them and examine how international 
migration  affects  the  income  of  individuals  in  sending  and  receiving  countries,  and  of 
migrants themselves. We also analyze under which conditions there is positive or negative 
self-selection of migrants.  
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Abstract. We consider a model of international migration where skills of workers are
imperfectly observed by ﬁrms in the host country and where information asymmetries
are more severe for immigrants than for natives. There are two stages. In the ﬁrst one,
workers in the South decide whether to move and pay the migration costs. These costs
are assumed to be sunk. In the second stage, ﬁrms offer wages to the immigrant and na-
tive workers who are in the country. Because of imperfect information, ﬁrms statistically
dicriminate high-skilled migrants by paying them at their expected productivity. The de-
cision of whether to migrate or not depends on the proportion of high-skilled workers
among the migrants. The migration game exhibits strategic complementarities, which,
because of standard coordination problems, lead to multiple equilibria. We characterize
them and examine how international migration affects the income of individuals in send-
ing and receiving countries, and of migrants themselves. We also analyze under which
conditions there is positive or negative self-selection of migrants.
JEL Classiﬁcations: D82, J61, F22, O12.
Keywords: asymmetric information, screening, self-selection of migrants, skill-biased
migration, wage differentials.
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should the country admit?” George J. Borjas (1999).
1 Introduction
Even though international migration is quite uncommon,1 it generates a lot of controver-
sial debates. The current policy debate about international immigration in the United
States focuses in fact almost entirely on high-skilled workers. This is not unique to
the U.S. In Germany, for example, since the government approved Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeders “green card” plan in 2000, the law gives 20,000 high-skilled immigrants 5 year
temporary work permits in order to ease the perceived shortage of IT workers. Similar
proposals of making temporary work permits more easily available for high-skilled im-
migrants are taking place in Great Britain, Ireland and even Sri Lanka. This can explain
the overall tendency for migration rates to be much higher for the highly-skilled. Between
1990 and 2000, the total number of foreign-born individuals legally residing in the OECD
member countries has been multiplied by 1.4, with a larger increase for highly skilled
migrants ( 1.64) than for low skilled migrants ( 1.14) (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006).
In high-income receiving countries, the concern is that the wrong individuals are trying
to get in (Borjas, 1999), though this position has generated controversy (Card, 2005). It
is not, however, clear if high-skilled migration always has positive effects on the source
country. When there are positive spillovers associated with human capital (Lucas, 1988)
or education is ﬁnanced through taxation (Bhagwati and Rodriguez, 1975), the emigra-
tion of skilled labor can in fact hinder economic development (Benhabib and Jovanovic,
2011).2
The aim of the present paper is to analyze the migration process of both high-skilled
and low-skilled migrants and examine how this affects the economy of the host country,
in particular the wages of high-skilled and low-skilled workers.
To be more precise, we develop a model of international migration from a ”Southern”
country to a ”Northern” country (for example, from Mexico to the United States), where
the North has an absolute advantage in terms of productivity and skill premium. Mi-
1See Figure 1 in Hanson (2009) which, using data compiled by the United Nations, shows that in 2005
individuals residing outside of their country of birth comprised just 3 percent of the world’s population.
2For overviews on these issues, see Bhagwati and Hanson (2009) and Hanson (2009).
2grants can be high-skilled or low-skilled. Any worker can be assigned to two different
tasks. In the simple task, all workers in a given country have the same low productivity
whereas, in the more complex task, a high-skilled worker’s productivity is higher than
a low-skilled worker’s productivity. Firms in the host country do not perfectly observe
the skills of migrants and perform a noisy test. High-skilled migrants always pass the
test while only a fraction of low-skilled migrants pass it. Firms statistically discriminate
high-skilled migrants by paying workers who passed the test at their average produc-
tivity. This productivity is lower than the high-skilled migrants real productivity since
some low-skilled workers (those who have passed the test) are wrongly considered as
high-skilled. The quality of the test could be a proxy of the cultural distance between the
two countries. It is clearly more difﬁcult for the UK to assess the skill of a migrant from
Kazakhstan than from India, given the past colonial history between the UK and India.
In this context, we consider a two-stage model, where, in the ﬁrst stage, workers in
the South decide whether to move and pay the migration cost, while, in the second stage,
ﬁrms offer wages to the immigrant and native workers who are in the country. In the ﬁrst
stage, the decision of whether to migrate or not depends on the proportion of high-skilled
workers among the migrants. In equilibrium, anticipations about the percentage of mi-
grants of each type are rational, i.e. the anticipated productivity of migrants is equal to
the true productivity of migrants. The migration game exhibits strategic complementar-
ities, which, because of standard coordination problems, lead to multiple equilibria. The
existence of multiple equilibria illustrates the coordination problem among migrants. In-
deed, if they anticipate that no high-skilled worker migrates, then they anticipate that
all migrants will be paid at the low-skilled native wage and those anticipations are self-
conﬁrming. If they anticipate that some high-skilled workers migrate, then they antici-
pate that migrants who successfully pass the screening test will be paid more than the
low-skilled native wage. Depending on the value of the parameters of the model, sev-
eral levels of high-skilled workers migration may be self-conﬁrming. We show that two
types of equilibria emerge. There is a high-discrimination equilibrium for which all im-
migrants are offered low-skilled tasks, irrespective of the outcome of the screening test.
In that case, no high-skilled workers migrate; only the low-skilled ones. There is also a
low-discrimination equilibrium, where all migrants who pass the screening test are of-
fered high-skilled tasks, whereas all immigrants who fail the screening test are offered
3low-skilled tasks.
We characterize these equilibria and examine how international migration affects the
incomes of individuals in sending and receiving countries, and of migrants themselves.
We ﬁnd that the quality of the screening test (i.e. the “social or cultural” distance between
the two countries) affects wages as well as the skill composition of the migrants. The
better is this test, the higher is the wage of high-skilled migrants and the “better” is the
quality of migrants. Indeed, when the test becomes better, high-skilled migrants are more
likely to migrate because they will be paid at their “real” productivity. Similar results are
obtained for the ex ante proportion of low-skilled workers in the South and in the North
and in the productivity difference between the North and the South. In particular, we ﬁnd
that the pool of migrants from countries that are much poorer have a relatively low skill
premium compared to recipient countries or are characterized by lower informational
barrier or a large proportion of skilled workers will be more skilled.
We then endogenize the productivities of workers to understand the impact of migra-
tion on native wages. With a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation for each country, the skill pre-
miumisdeterminedbytherelativescarcityofhigh-skilledworkers. Inahigh-discrimination
equilibrium, only low-skilled workers migrate and the skill-ratio in the South necessar-
ily increases, while the skill-ratio in the North necessarily decreases. This means that
the wage of high-skilled workers staying in the South decreases, while the wage of high-
skilled workers in the North increases. In a low discrimination equilibrium, things are
less clear. Depending on the skill composition of migrants, the skill-ratio can decrease in
the South and increase in the North or decrease in both countries. It can also increase in
the South and decrease in the North (since the skill-ratio is initially higher in the North
than in the South these are the relevant cases). To understand these issues, we resort to
numerical simulations. We ﬁnd that an increase in the initial proportion of low-skilled
workers in the South or in the initial proportion of low-skilled workers in the North,
has a positive impact on high-skilled native wages and a negative impact on low-skilled
native wages. When the proportion of low-skilled workers in the South increases, less
high-skilled workers migrate to the North because they are pooled with more low-skilled
migrants. Therefore the skill premium decreases. As a result, high-skilled workers are
becoming more scarce in the North while low-skilled workers are more available and
therefore high-skilled native wages increase while low-skilled native wages decrease.
42 Related literature
There has been some literature on the effect of asymetric information on migration (Katz
and Stark, 1984, 1986, 1987a,b, and Kwok and Leland, 1982). The closest paper to ours is
the one by Katz and Stark (1987a). They consider a model in which heterogenous workers
(in terms of skills) from a poor country consider to migrate to a rich country. They assume
that foreign employers are less well-informed than the migrants about the workers’ skills
and statistically discriminate by giving the same average wage (or productivity) to all
migrants, whatever their skills. Contrary to us, they focus on the differences between
the perfect information and the asymetric information cases. Their main result shows
that the skill composition of the workforce can differ between the two regimes. In the
perfect information case, it can be that low-skilled and high-skilled migrants migrate but
not workers with intermediate skills whereas this is never possible in the asymetric case
since, if it is beneﬁcial for a migrant of a given skill to migrate, then it is automatically
true for all migrants of a lower skill. This (pooling equilibrium) result is driven by the
fact that employers statistically discriminate but also because all workers have the same
migration cost. They then extend this model to allow for workers to signal their skill,
assuming that the signalling cost is the same for all workers. They show that the top-
skill individuals are the most likely to signal their quality. Because of signalling, the
authors can retrieve a similar result than the one found in the perfect information case.
Indeed, the equilibrium migration pattern that emerges is characterized by the fact that
the least skilled migrate without signalling, the intermediate group does not migrate and
the highly skilled migrate with a signal (this is shown in a numerical example but not
proved formally for the general case). Finally, in the last part of their paper, Katz and
Stark (1987a) introduce the possibility that the true skill of migrants can be discovered
after some time. They show that, in this case, more high-skilled workers will migrate. In
more recent papers, Stark (1995) and Chau and Stark (1999) investigate the latter issue by
focusing on return migration. As in the other models, because of unknown information
about skills, local employers give to new migrants a wage based on the average product
of the group of migrants. However, after some time, skills are discovered and only the
low-skilled workers go back to their home country.
Our present model is different from Katz and Stark (1987a) for different reasons. First,
we do not focus on the difference between the perfect information and the asymmetric in-
5formation cases. Rather our focus is on the impact of the initial productivity gap () and
the cultural similarity or distance () between the two countries on the skill composition
of the migrants, the level of discrimination against migrants, the different possible equi-
libria that can emerge and the wage difference between natives and migrants. Second,
our analysis suggests that multiple equilibria are likely to emerge because of self-fulﬁlling
discrimination. We totally characterize the equilibria and analyze their properties. Third,
we endogenize productivity and wages of all workers, which allows us to determine the
impact of migration on native wages, an important issue in the international migration
literature. Finally, we discuss some policy issues such as taxation of low-skill workers.
3 The model
We consider an economy consisting of two countries, each populated by a unit mass of
risk-neutral workers. One country (N, the “North”) has a technological advantage over
the other (S, the “South”), reﬂected by the fact that the productivity is higher in ﬁrms
located in N than in ﬁrms located in S.
Workers differ in productivity, and there are two types of workers, with high (H) and
low (L) skills. Any worker can be assigned to two different tasks. In the simple task,
all workers in a given country i have the same productivity, LiwL; i 2 fN;Sg, whereas,
in the more complex task, a high-skilled worker’s productivity is HiwH while a low-
skilled worker’s productivity is LiwL; where wH > wL: Productivity is higher in the
North in all tasks. In particular, LN =  > LS = 1 and HN =   > HS = 1: Note
that the parameter  captures absolute cross-country productivity differences, whereas
  parameterizes differences in the extent of wage inequality. In particular,   < 1 (  >
1) means that the skill premium is lower (higher) in the North than in the South. We






. This ensures that (i) the skill premium is positive in
the North and (ii) native skilled workers in the North earn a higher wage than skilled
workers in the South, implying that it is possible to have migration of skilled workers in
equilibrium.
Firms observe a signal (school record) that is assumed, for simplicity, to perfectly re-
veal the type of native workers within each country. In country S (resp. country N), there
are  (resp. 
) workers of type L and (1   ) (resp. (1   
)) workers of type H. Firms are
6competitive and workers are paid at their marginal product.
We assume that workers can migrate at a cost c: This cost is individual-speciﬁc, and its
c.d.f. is assumed to be i.i.d across types. In particular, the density function is uniformly
distributed over the interval [0; c]. The functional form is intended to obtain closed-form
solutions. Note that a positive migration ﬂow will always be observed as long as there
are wage differentials across countries. Clearly, migration ﬂows will only go from S to N.
The timing of the model is the following. In the ﬁrst stage, workers in the South decide
whether to move and pay the migration costs. These costs are assumed to be sunk. In
the second stage, ﬁrms offer wages to the immigrant and native workers who are in the
country.
We proceed backward and ﬁrst concentrate on the second stage of the model. We
introduce the realistic assumption that information asymmetries are more severe for im-
migrants than for natives. More precisely, we assume that the school record of an immi-
grant is imperfectly observed (or imperfectly understood) by ﬁrms in the host country. In
particular, we denote by  2 [0;1] the probability that Northern ﬁrms observe a negative
school record for a low-skilled immigrant (for a low-skilled native,  = 1). The realization
of what ﬁrms observe is unknown to the worker when he decides to migrate. We denote
by + the event “to migrate, go through a screening process in the North and not being
found with a negative record”. For example, P (+ j J); for J 2 fH;Lg, is the joint prob-
ability that a worker of type J (i) migrates and (ii) is screened and not found to have a
negative school record. Similarly, P (  j J) is the joint probability that a worker of type
J (i) migrates and (ii) is found to have a negative school record. Clearly, P (  j H) = 0.
An immigrant whose negative school record is observed by a Northern ﬁrm will be
assigned to a simple task and offered the wage wL. An immigrant whose test score is not
observed by a Northern ﬁrm will earn a wage w
+
M to be determined in equilibrium. Thus,




M = wL + (1   )w
+
M (1)
High-skilled immigrants earn a safe wage w
+
M. This is the same wage that is earned by
low-skilled immigrants whose negative school record has passed undetected by the em-
ploying ﬁrm in the North. Thus, in equilibrium, ﬁrms will pay immigrants with a “clean
7record” a wage equal to
w
+
M = P(H j 
+) wH + P(L j 
+)wL (2)
In other words, Northern ﬁrms facing a group of workers whose individual productiv-
ity is unknown (they have all passed the test) offer the same wage to all. This wage is
equal to the average productivity of the group. In this respect, Northern ﬁrms statisti-
cally discriminate the high-skilled immigrants by offering them a lower wage than the
local high-skilled workers (w
+
M   wH). It is interesting to observe that, in our sim-
ple framework where high- and low-skilled workers are perfect substitutes, low-skilled
migrants earn on average a higher wage than their local counterparts since w
 
M  wL.
4 The migration game
We now come back to the ﬁrst stage of the model where each type of workers decides to
migrate of not. For simplicity, we assume  c to be sufﬁciently large to ensure that (given
the other parameters of the model) neither all low-skilled nor all high-skilled workers
migrate from the South to the North.
This ﬁrst stage is a strategic form game played by a continuum of players: the workers
in country S. There are two types of players, the low-skilled and the high-skilled workers
and each player is characterized by its type and its individual-speciﬁc cost of migration c.
Each player has two strategies : to stay in country S, the South, or to migrate to country
N, the North. A high-skilled worker with migration cost c obtains wH if he stays in the
South and w
+
M   c if he migrates. A low-skilled worker with migration cost c obtains wL
if he stays in the South and (1   )w
+




among the migrants, i.e. w
+
M depends on the strategy proﬁle of all workers in country S.
Suppose we ﬁx the strategies of all low-skilled workers. The reduced game played
by high-skilled workers exhibits strategic complementarities because w
+
M is increasing with
the number of high-skilled workers who migrate, as can be seen from equation (2), and
so is the payoff of a high-skilled worker contemplating migration. Therefore, the more
high-skilled workers choose to migrate, the higher the incentives of other high-skilled
8workers to migrate.3 This remark suggests that multiple equilibria are likely to emerge
in the migration game. We investigate this issue below and determine the pure strategy
Nash equilibria of the ﬁrst stage game.
In this game, all the strategic interactions go through the wage w
+
M. A high-skilled
worker prefers to stay in the South if and only if wH  w
+
M   c. This relation deﬁnes






such that workers with a cost larger (smaller)
than c+ stay (migrate). Given the uniform distribution, c+= c is the proportion of high-
skilled workers who migrate: Similarly, a low-skilled worker prefers to stay in the South
if and only if wL  w
 
M  c where w
 





M   wL) + wL(   1);0

implying that c = c is the proportion of low-
skilled workers who move to the North.
For technical convenience, we assume that  wH   wL <  c. This implies that even
in the limit case where immigrants suffer no discrimination some workers of both types
stay in the South.
We can now establish the following Lemma.
Lemma 1
(i) The probability that an immigrant for whom Northern ﬁrms did not detect a negative test








c (1   ) + c+ (1   )










M   wL) + wL(   1);0

.
(ii) In equilibrium, the wage earned by an immigrant who passed successfully the screening test




c+(1   ) wH + c (1   )wL














is deﬁned in the range w
+





















 0 if w
+
M 2 ]wH; wH]
3See Topkis (1998), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Vives (1990) for an overview of the literature on games
with strategic complementarities
9Proof: See the Appendix.
As stated above, the wage (3) corresponds to the average productivity of workers that
have passed the test and thus illustrates the statistical discrimination policy implemented
by Northern ﬁrms against high-skilled immigrants. Anticipations of workers concern-
ing the value of w
+
M correspond to anticipations concerning the decisions of other high-
and low-skilled workers in the migration game and therefore correspond to anticipations
concerning the expected productivity of migrants (i.e. the function (w
+
M)). For instance
if a worker anticipates (w
+
M) 2 [wL;wH], then he knows that only low-skilled workers
will migrate since the high-skilled workers are better off staying at home (thus c+ = 0
and c  > 0). Firms will therefore pay them wL like the local low-skilled workers. If this
worker anticipates a higher wage, (w
+
M) 2 ]wH; wH], then he knows that high-skilled
workers start to migrate (c+ and c  are now both strictly positive). As a result, there is
a positive monotonic relationship between the (w
+
M) and the expected productivity of
migrants. The concavity stems from the fact that when wages increase, both high- and
low- skill workers are induced to migrate so that at the margin the expected productivity
increases less and less.




M, i.e. the anticipated produc-
tivity of migrants is equal to the true productivity of migrants. We deﬁne an equilibrium
such that all immigrants are offered low-skilled tasks, irrespective of the outcome of the
screening test as a high-discrimination equilibrium. In this equilibrium, w
+
M = wL. We
deﬁne an equilibrium such that all immigrants who pass the screening test are offered
high-skilled tasks, whereas all immigrants who fail the screening test are offered low-
skilled tasks as a low-discrimination equilibrium. In the latter equilibrium, the wage is








(see Lemma 1) in the range
w
+
M 2 [wH; wH): Finally, we deﬁne an equilibrium such that w
+
M =  wH as a no-




wH (1 + )   wL (1 + ) + 2
p
 (wH   wL)(wH   wL)
(1   )wH
;
where 0 () < 0: Then,
101. If  > wH=wL, then, for all  2 (0;1), there exists a unique stable low-discrimination
equilibrium.
2. If  < wH=wL and   < (); then 9  (; ) 2 [0;1]; where   (; ) < 0 and    (; ) <
0 such that
(a) If  <   (; ), there exists a unique stable high-discrimination equilibrium.
(b) If  =   (; ), there exist a stable high-discrimination equilibrium and an unstable
low-discrimination equilibrium.
(c) If  >   (; ), there exist a stable high-discrimination equilibrium and two low-
discrimination equilibria, one stable and one unstable.
3. If < wH=wL and  > ();then, forall 2 (0;1), thereexistastablehigh-discrimination
equilibrium and two low-discrimination equilibria, one of which being unstable.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The existence of multiple equilibria illustrates the coordination problem among mi-
grants. If they anticipate that no high-skilled worker migrates, then they anticipate that
all migrants will be paid wL ; when wL  wH, those anticipations are self-conﬁrming,
i.e. they turn out to be correct. If they anticipate that some high-skilled workers migrate,
then they anticipate that migrants who successfully pass the screening test will be paid
more than wL. Depending on the value of the parameters of the model, several levels
of high-skilled workers migration may be self-conﬁrming. Figures 1, 2 and 3 provide an
illustration of Proposition 1. For each graph, we report the limit cases of  = 0 (no infor-
mation about immigrants’ types) and  = 1 (perfect information) as well as intermediate













= wL for w
+






= wH for w
+






is strictly decreasing in , for any w
+
M > wH. For any  < 1, including the limit case













< wH for any w
+
M 2 [0;wH]:
Figure 1 describes case 1 in the Proposition, i.e.,  > wH=wL. In this case, due to
the large cross-country productivity difference, some high-skilled workers would be pre-
pared to migrate even if they were offered the low-skilled task in the North. But this
11implies that high-discrimination is not sustainable in equilibrium. If workers passing the
screening test were offered the low-skilled wage wL, their average productivity would
exceed wL; ruling out the existence of a high-discrimination equilibrium. Therefore, and
due to the concavity of the function , there exists a unique low-discrimination equilib-
rium described by point L in Figure 1.
Figure 2 describes case 2 in the Proposition, i.e.,  < wH=wL and   < (). In this case,
the nature of the set of equilibria depends on the extent of the informational asymmetry.
When  is low, ( <   (; )), i.e. large informational asymmetry, the only equilibrium
features high discrimination (point H0 in Figure 2). This is a standard case of “market
for lemons” (Akerlof, 1970). The informational asymmetry drives out of the market high-
skilled immigrants. No equilibrium in which immigrants are offered high-skilled tasks is
sustainable for low values of ; and only the high-discrimination equilibrium, described
by point H0 in Figure 2, is sustained. If ﬁrms in the North were to offer higher salaries to
immigrants passing the screening test, they would be swamped by a large proportion of
low-skilled immigrants that are undistinguishable from the high-skilled ones. Relatively
low productivity differences together with a low skill premium in the North cause the
migration ﬂow to be dominated by the incentive for low-skilled workers to migrate in the
hope of being pooled with the high-skilled ones. While the average skill of immigrants
increases in response to higher salaries, the increase is not steep enough to sustain a low-
discrimination equilibrium. This is due to the joint effect of a low ; a low   and a low







is tangent to the 45o line and there are two equilibria (described by points H0 and
K0 in Figure 2). Whenever  >   (; ), there exist three equilibria (described by points
H0, M0 and L0 in Figure 2), two of them (M0 and L0) featuring low discrimination. These
emerge because informational imperfections are now less severe. In this case, there are
multiple self-fulﬁlling beliefs. In the low-discrimination equilibrium (L0), workers in the
South expect that, in the second-stage, ﬁrms in the North will offer high wages to those
passing the test. It is then optimal for high-skilled workers with low mobility costs to
migrate. Firms offering high-skilled tasks to immigrant at the equilibrium wage will,
on average, be satisﬁed with the immigrants’ performance. In the high-discrimination
equilibrium (H0), instead, high-skilled workers do not move since they expect low wages.
Of the two low-discrimination equilibria (M0 and L0 in Figure 2), only the one with
12the highest wage (L0) is stable to wage perturbations. In particular, consider an equilib-
rium like M0 in Figure 2. If migrant workers anticipate a slightly higher (lower) wage
than the one corresponding to M0, the average productivity of the pool of immigrants
who passed the test would increase (decrease) by more than the initial wage increase (de-
crease). Thus, ﬁrms would be induced to offer an even higher (lower) wage, and so on,
until the equilibrium L0 (H0) is reached.
Figure 3 describes case 3 in the Proposition, i.e.,  < wH=wL and   > (). In this case,
there are multiple equilibria irrespective of : As before, the low-discrimination equilib-
rium corresponding to M00 in Figure 3 is unstable. Intuitively, the skill premium   in the
North is large enough to guarantee that the average quality of the pool of immigrants
responds sufﬁciently to increases in the wage to sustain an equilibrium with low discrim-
ination.
In the migration game, decisions to migrate can be strategic complements or substi-
tutes depending on the types of the migrants. Everything else being equal, the more
high-skilled workers migrate, the more it pays for both types of workers to migrate. And
the more low-skilled workers migrate the less it pays for both types of workers to migrate.
However, the migration game is essentially a game with strategic complementarities as
we explain now. Suppose we modify slightly the timing of our game and suppose that
workers in the South take their migration decision sequentially : ﬁrst, high-skilled work-
ers decide to migrate or not and second, after observing the number of high-skilled mi-
grants, low-skilled workers take their migration decision. We shall argue that this game
is strategically equivalent to our migration game for high-skilled workers and that, after
applying backward induction, the ﬁrst-stage exhibits strategic complementarities.4
Proposition 2 Suppose high-skilled workers in the South simultaneously decide to migrate or not
before low-skilled workers decide simultaneously to migrate or not and that low-skilled workers
observe the high-skilled workers decisions,
1. For any ﬁxed number of high-skilled migrants, the subgame played by low-skilled migrants
has only one equilibrium,
2. When they correctly anticipate the equilibrium behavior of low-skilled workers, high-skilled
migrants play a ﬁrst-stage game that exhibits strategic complementarities,
4Such a modiﬁcation of the timing of the migration game is reminiscent of the modiﬁcations of games
with a large number of players studied by Kalai (2004).
133. The subgame perfect equilibria of this sequential migration game coincide with the equilibria
of the simultaneous migration game.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 highlights the fact that strategic complementarities in the migration de-
cisions of high-skilled migrants are crucial for the analysis. These complementarities ex-
plain the multiplicity of equilibria and suggest that equilibria can be Pareto ranked. In
fact, the higher the equilibrium wage w
+
M, the higher the welfare of all workers in the
South.
It is worth noting that, in any low-discrimination equilibrium, low-skilled immigrants
are, on average, better paid than low-skilled natives. This is because they pool, with
some probability, with the high-skilled workers from the same country. By converse, the
high-skilled immigrants are systematically paid less than native workers with identical
qualiﬁcation.
To complete the study, we establish some comparative statics results. There are basi-
cally two types of equilibria. The high-discrimination equilibrium where all migrants are
paid wL is not very interesting and the comparative statics results are straightforward.
As a result, we focus on the stable low-discrimination equilibrium and restrict attention
to parameter values for which it exists.
Proposition 3 When it exists, the stable low-discrimination equilibrium wage w
+
M offered to mi-






















Proof: See the Appendix.
These results are quite intuitive. When the test becomes better, i.e.  increases, the
pool of migrants is of better quality and therefore their expected productivity increases.
As a result, w
+
M also increases. The intuition is similar for the skill premium   and  the
percentage of low-skilled workers in the South. Indeed, when   increases, more high-
skilled workers migrate and thus w
+
M increases. When  increases, the quality of the
14migrantsdecreasesandsodoesw
+
M. Interestingly, theeffectof, theabsoluteproductivity
difference between the two countries, on w
+
M is ambiguous. Indeed, when  increases,
both skilled and unskilled workers are attracted to the North and thus the average quality
of migrants can increase or decrease, depending which force dominates the other. If,
however, (1   ) > 1, meaning that  has to be quite high (since (1   ) < 1), then the
net effect is positive.
Wecanﬁnallydeterminetheskillcompositionoftheimmigrants. Thisisimportantbe-
cause it will determine whether there is positive (negative) selection of migrants, i.e. if the
skillsofmigrantsinthehostcountryishigher(lower)thanthatinthecountryoforigin. In
high-discrimination equilibria, only low-skilled workers migrate. We focus therefore on
cases where a low-discrimination equilibrium exists and is stable, and study the selection
effects. Given the uniform distribution, the migration ﬂow consists of (1   )(w
+
M wH)=c




M   wL) + wL(   1)

=c low-skilled workers.
Proposition 4 The proportion of high-to-low skill immigrants in the stable low-discrimination




















































Given the comparative statics of the equilibrium wage w
+
M (see Proposition 3) in a





migr is increasing in w
+
M; it is straight-
forward to show that the equilibrium proportion of high-to-low skill immigrants is in-
creasing in ;   and decreasing in . Thus, the model predicts that the pool of immigrants
from countries that have a relatively low skill premium compared to recipient countries
(high  ) or are characterized by lower informational barrier (high ) or a large proportion
of skilled workers (low ) will be more skilled. The condition (1   ) > 1 is likely to be
15veriﬁed when either the informational asymmetries are important ( small) and/or the
productivity gap between the two countries is big ( >> 1). When it is veriﬁed, the equi-
librium proportion of high-to-low skill immigrants is increasing in  : it is larger when
the country of origin is poorer.
In the speciﬁc model of Borjas (1987), based on the Roy model, a fall in the income in
the United States or an increase in migration costs (here a fall in ), implies that fewer
workers migrate. However, it does not change the skill composition of the workers that
migrate. It is clear that, in our model, a change in  affects both the skill composition
of the migrants and the number of migrants. In fact, when  is very high (large income
differences between N and S), most of the migrants will be highly skilled (Figure 1). In-
deed, in this case, there is only a low-discriminating equilibrium in which Northern ﬁrms
are prepared to employ immigrants in high-skilled jobs, although paying them less than
natives for an identical job. In particular, all workers passing the screening process are
assigned to high-skilled jobs. Their wage is determined according to statistical discrimi-
nation. High-skilled workers, in turn, anticipate that good job opportunities exist in the
North, and a share of them decides to migrate. The pool of immigrants is, in this equilib-
rium, superior in terms of average skill and there is more migration. When  decreases
and reaches intermediate values (Figure 2), more people migrate to N, the rich country,
since both high- and low-skilled workers migrate. Finally, when  is further reduced and
reach small values (Figure 3), depending of the value of  the skill composition and the
number of migrants will be affected.
Let us investigate the issue of self-selection of migrants.




(1   )wH   wL(1   )
1      (1   )
(4)
The proof of this proposition is straightforward. Indeed, in equilibrium, there are
(1   )c+ high-skilled migrants out of the (1   )c+ + c  total number of migrants.
As a result, the proportion of high-skilled migrants is the ratio of these two quantities.
Similarly, the proportion of high-skilled non migrants is the ratio between the number of
non-migrants that stay in the home country, i.e., (1   )( c   c+), and the total individuals
thatdonotmigrate, whichis: (1 )( c c+)+( c c ). Thus, thereispositiveself-selection
16if and only if:
(1   )c+
(1   )c+ + c  >
(1   )( c   c+)
(1   )( c   c+) + ( c   c )
(5)
Solvingthisequationleadsto c+ > c , which, usingthevaluesof c+ andc  givesequation
(4).
5 Empirical predictions
We would like to stress several empirical predictions of our model:
(1) Unless the screening test is perfect (i.e.,  = 1), there is always a wage discrep-
ancy between native and immigrant high-skilled workers. In other words, high-skilled
immigrants are always less paid than their native counterparts.5 The wage difference between
high-skilled native and migrant workers decreases with . This is not true for low-skilled
migrants who are paid the same wage than low-skilled native workers. However, migra-
tion always implies a higher wage compared to home wages.
(2) When there is a sufﬁciently large productivity gap (i.e., (1   ) > 1) between the
two countries (e.g. India and UK, Mexico and US, North Africa and France, Turkey and
Germany), our model predicts that the wage differences between immigrants and native
will be decreasing with the productivity gap.
(3) If the productivity gap is not large but  is low (e.g. migration from Europe to the
US or from France to the UK), it is more likely to have only one equilibrium, which is a
high-discriminating equilibrium (large wage differences between immigrants and native
and only low-skilled workers migrate).
(4) If the productivity gap is not large and  is quite high (for example, migration
between the South and the North of Italy or even between different states in the US), we
have multiple equilibria.
(5) One important proxy for migration costs is distance. Our model thus implies that
migrants from nearby areas will be less positively self-selected (i.e. will have more low
skills). Thus migration from Mexico to the United States should be negatively selected
5A good example of this is the immigration of Russian people to Israel. Most of them were highly quali-
ﬁed (PhDs, medical doctors...) but lack of educational credentials. When they arrive, they were allocated to
low-skilled jobs. Weiss et al. (2003) show that on average, Russian immigrants can expect lifetime earnings
to fall short of the lifetime earnings of comparable natives by 57 percent.
17(for evidence see, e.g., Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2007), Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2011),
McKenzie and Rapoport (2010)) than migration from, say, India to the United States. In
other words, is distance a powerful determinant of the skills characteristics of immi-
grants? Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) show that it is true form people migrating to the
United States.
The essence of our information-theoretic model is statistical discrimination. Because
what often distinguishes international from internal migration is in part how visible the
foreign-born are, the issue of statistical discrimination and its implication for who mi-
grates should be explored empirically. Most of the US studies show that, initially (i.e.
when they arrive), immigrant earnings are below the ones of native (see e.g. Chiswick,
1978; Carliner, 1980; Borjas, 1999). The reasons put forward by these authors are the fol-
lowing. When immigrants arrive in the United States, they lack many of the skills that
are valued by American employers. These US-speciﬁc skills include language, educa-
tional credentials, and information on what the best-paying jobs are and where they are
located.
The following table drawn from Borjas (1995) indicates the skills and the wage differ-
ence between native and immigrants when the latter arrive in the US.
18Table 1: Skill Differences Between Newly Arrived Immigrants
and Natives at Time of Entry
Difference in Years of





It is easily seen from this table that newly immigrants in 1960 had about one-half year
more schooling than natives but earned 13 percent less than natives at the time of arrival.
On the other hand, newly immigrants in 1990 had a lower level of education (1.32 fewer
years of schooling) and earned 31.6 percent less than natives. This shows that immigrants
in the 1990s are less educated (or skilled) than those in the sixties. Observe however that,
in the 1990s, there are still high-skilled immigrants but the weight is more on the low-
skilled ones. Indeed, by the late 1990s, almost 40 percent of the immigrants were in the
bottom two deciles of the native wage distribution, and only 14 percent were in the top
two deciles (Borjas,1999).
This facts seem to be in accordance with the fact that the US immigration policy deem-
phasizes skills as a condition of admission. Indeed, after the 1965 Amendments to the
Immigration and Nationality Act, the US authorities switch from a national origins quota
system (where mostly persons from Western Europe were admitted) to a family ties sys-
tem where the key factor of acceptance was a tie to persons already living in the US. A
number of studies (see in particular Borjas, 1987, and LaLonde and Topel, 1992) have tried
to explain the decline in relative skills across migrant waves. These studies have shown
that the main culprit is the changing of national-origin mix of the immigrant ﬂows. In-
deed, post-1965 immigrants are more likely to originate in Latin American and Asian
countries whereas pre-1965 are mainly coming from European countries. The following
drawn from Borjas (1994) gives us interesting results.
19Table 2: Wages of Immigrant Men in 1990, by Country of Birth
Percent Wage Differential Between

















Table 2 shows stark disparities in the relative wage of immigrants across national-
origingroups. Forexample, immigrantsfromtheUnitedKingdom, GermanyandCanada
earnrespectively37:2, 24:5and24:0percentmorethannativeswhereasthosefromMexico
and Dominican Republic earn respectively 39:5 and 29:2 percent less than natives.
One explanation put forward is how easy it is to transfer skills from one country to
another (this is captured by  in our model since a higher  implies easier skill transfers).
InadvancedeconomiessuchasUnitedKingdomorGermany, thetypesofskillsrewarded
by ﬁrms are similar with the US whereas, in developing countries, they are quite different
and the test  is very imperfect. It has been in fact shown empirically that there is a strong
positive correlation between the earnings of an immigrant group in the United States and
per capita GDP in the country of origin. In our model, this implies a positive correlation
between wages and . This means that, controlling for skills, wages in an equilibrium
where  is small (Figure 3) should be higher than wages in an equilibrium where  is
20large (Figure 1). Some empirical studies (see in particular Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1986)
conclude thata doubling ofthe source country’sper capita GDPincreases the USearnings
of an immigrant group as much as 4 percent.
6 Endogenizing wages
So far, the productivity of workers in different tasks has been taken as exogenous. In this
section, we endogenize wages in both countries and for simplicity normalize  c = 1. We
consider a situation where there is a unit mass of workers in the South with a proportion 
of low-skilled, and a unit mass of workers in the North with a proportion 
 of low-skilled.
Denote by HN and LN the number of high-skilled and low-skilled workers employed in
the North (these include both natives and migrants). Denote also by wHS and wLS the
wages in the South for high-skilled and low-skilled workers, respectively. We have:
HN = 1   
 + (1   )c
+ = 1   
 + (1   )(w
+




 + [(1   )w
+
M   (1   )wLS)] (7)
Similarly, denote by HS and LS the number of high-skilled and low-skilled workers em-
ployed in the South (i.e. those who have not migrated). We can write (remember that
 c = 1):
HS = (1   )( c   c
+) = (1   )(1   w
+
M + wHS) (8)
LS = ( c   c
 ) = [1   (1   )w
+
M + (1   )wLS)] (9)
It is easily veriﬁed that HN + LN + HS + LS = 2, the total population of the two
countries.
Letusnowspecifytheproductiontechnology. WeassumeaCobb-Douglasproduction






If we denote by hN =
HN
LN , the proportion of high-to-low skilled workers in the North, we
can then express the competitive wages in the North as
wHN   wH = NANh
N 1
N and wLN  wL = (1   N)ANh
N
N (10)
21where wHN and wLN are the wages in the North for high-skilled and low-skilled workers,
respectively. This implies that the marginal productivity of high-skilled workers (resp. of
low-skilled workers) is decreasing (resp. increasing) in hN, the proportion of high-to-low







We can express the competitive wages in the South as
wHS = SASh
S 1





LS denotes the proportion of high-to-low skilled workers in the South. From



















In equilibrium, the number of high-skilled migrants is given by
Hmigr = (1   )(w
+
M   wHS)





M   (1   )wLS

:




















(1   )(1   w
+
M + wHS)
[(1   (1   )w
+
M + (1   )wLS)]
(15)






M   wHS)(1   )wHN + [(1   )w
+
M   (1   )wLS](1   )wLN
(w
+
M   wHS)(1   ) + [(1   )w
+
M   (1   )wLS](1   )
(16)
Equations (14), (15) and (16) together with the adequate expressions of wHS and wLS
(equations (10) and (11)) and  (equation (12) ) provide us with a system of three equa-
tions with three unknowns (hN;hS;w
+
M).
22At this stage, rather than studying the general properties of the equilibrium, we detail
some numerical examples. Having in mind the migration from Mexico to the United
States, we set 
 = 0.5 (i.e. 50 percent of workers in the US are unskilled) and  = 0.9 (i.e.
90 percent of workers in Mexico are unskilled); see Table A4 for 2000 in Docquier et al.
(2010). For the other parameters, we set N = S = 0.5,  = 0.4, AS = 1 and AN = 3, meaning
that, for a given ratio hN=hS, productivity in the US is three times higher than in Mexico.
We obtain an equilibrium (Table 3) for which hN = 0.45 and hS = 0.34. This means that,
in equilibrium, the proportion of high-to-low skilled workers in the North is 45 percent
while it is 34 percent in the South. Looking at Hmig and Lmig, one can see that 2 percent
of high-skilled and 67 percent of low-skilled workers have migrated to the North. If we
consider the wages now, high-skilled native workers are paid more than twice as much
as high-skilled migrants (wHN / w
+
M = 2.12) while the difference between high-skilled
migrant and non-migrant wages is relatively small (w
+
M / wHS = 1.25). This explains the
low proportion of high-skilled migrants. Concerning low-skill migrants, their expected
wage in the North (w
 
M = wLN +(1 )w
+
M = 1.04) is much higher than their wage in the
South (wLS = 0:29), i.e. in expectation, the wage in the North is 3.6 higher than what they
obtain in the South. This explains the high proportion of low-skilled migrants.
If we now consider the case of perfect information ( = 1, column 3 in Table 3), then
high-skilled migration increases from 2 to 8 percent and low-skilled migration also in-
creases from 67 to 76 percent. High-skilled migation increases because now high-skilled
migrants are paid exactly the same wage as high-skilled natives (w
+
M = wHN = 2.20). De-
spite the fact that low-skilled migrants are never mistaken for high-skilled workers, low-
skilled migration also increases because the low-skilled wage in the North has increased
while low-skilled wage in the South has decreased. Interestingly, even though both high-
skilled and low-skilled migrations have increased, the proportion of high-to-low skilled
workers in the North has slightly increases while it has sharply decreases in the South,
from 34 percent to 13 percent. The latter is due to the fact that, , the absolute productivity
difference between the North and the South has sharply increased, from 3.41 to 5.68.
23Table 3: Steady-state equilibrium














In this setting, it is possible to study the consequences of migration on native wages
wHN and wLN and skill ratio. With the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcations, for each country
the skill premium is determined by the relative scarcity of high-skilled work. In a high-
discrimination equilibrium, only low-skilled workers migrate and the skill-ratio in the
South necessarily increases, while the skill-ratio in the North necessarily decreases. This
means that the wage of high-skilled workers staying in the South decreases, while the
wage of high-skilled workers in the North increases. In a low discrimination equilibrium,
things are less clear. Depending on the skill composition of migrants, the skill-ratio can
decrease in the South and increase in the North or decrease in both countries. It can also
increase in the South and decrease in the North (since the skill-ratio is initially higher in
the North than in the South these are the relevant cases). If the skill-ratio decreases in
both countries, then the wage of high-skilled workers increases in both countries, while
if the skill-ratio decreases in the South and increases in the North, the wage of high-
skilled workers increases in the South and decreases in the North. Finally, if the skill-
ratio increases in the South and decreases in the North, then the wage of high-skilled
workers staying in the South decreases, while the wage of high-skilled workers in the
North increases.
Figures 4 and 5 display the impact of an increase in , the initial proportion of low-
skilled workers in the South, and 
, the initial proportion of low-skilled workers in the
24North, on native wages wHN and wLN. In both cases,  and 
 have a positive impact on
high-skilled native wages wHN and a negative impact on low-skilled native wages wLN.
When  increases, this impact is due to the fact that less high-skilled workers migrate to
the North because they are pooled with more low-skilled workers. Thus the skill pre-
mium hN decreases. As a result, high-skilled workers are becoming more scarce in the
North while low-skilled workers are more available and therefore wHN increases while
wLN decreases.
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 here]
Figure 6 shows the impact of , the quality of the test, on native wages. Not surpris-
ingly, when  increases, more skilled workers migrate to the North because they are more
and more paid at their ”real” value, and thus their wages increase. This makes high-
skilled workers in the North less scarce and thus native high-skilled wages wHN decrease
and native low-skilled wages wHS increase. We have done more numerical simulations
and performed different robustness checks and the results stay the same. Increasing pa-
rameters (such as, for example, N or AN) that increases hN, the proportion of high-to-low
skilled workers in the North, by attracting more high-skilled migrants, will have a neg-
ative impact on native high-skilled wages and a positive impact on low-skilled native
wages. This is true for any low-discrimination equilibrium. This would not be true in a
high-discrimination equilibrium since high-skilled workers will not migrate.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
It is interesting to compare our results on the effects of migration on native wages with
those of the literature. From a theoretical viewpoint, two main effects have been put for-
ward. First, immigration increases the labor force of the receiving country. This growth
in labor supply affects average wages in the economy if other factors of production like
capital are ﬁxed due to changes in relative scarcities. Even if other factors of production
adjust, this labor growth directly affects the average wage due to simple composition
effects if the distribution of educations and skills of immigrants differs from the native
population. Second, immigrants are also expected to lower the relative wages or employ-
ment of natives for whom they are close substitutes. This decline is due to a change in
the relative supply of worker types. Interestingly, in our framework, the main chanel is
25through the imperfect information on migrants’ skills. In other words, even if natives
and migrants are close substitutes, it is not certain that immigrants will lower the relative
wages of natives. This depends on  and thus the social and cultural distance between
the two countries.6
Empirically, the results are mixed. Dustmann et al. (2008) ﬁnd very little evidence for
wage effects in their review of the UK experience. This parallels an earlier conclusion by
Friedberg and Hunt (1995) that immigration had little impact on native wages; overall,
their survey of the earlier literature found that a 10 percent increase in the immigrant
share of the labor force reduced native wages by about 1 percent. Recent meta-surveys
by Longhi et al. (2005, 2010) and Okkerse (2008) found comparable, small effects across
many studies. Borjas (2003) provided the strongest criticism of regional studies and their
limited effects. Borjas argued that the US comprised a national labor market. Looking
within cohort-schooling-experience cells, Borjas found large, negative wage effects due to
immigration. He measured that a 10 percent increase in immigrant labor supply reduced
native weekly earnings by 3 to 4 percent. A recent study for OECD countries ﬁnds that
immigration has had a positive average wage effect on native workers (see, Docquier et
al., 2010). Much of the recent literature has debated these methodologies and ﬁndings,
with particular emphasis on how substitutable immigrant and native workers are.7
7 Policy issues
The immigration policy strongly inﬂuences the skill composition of immigrants. For
example, since the mid-1960s, Canada has used a point system to allocate many of its
available visas. Points are awarded according to different criteria, including education,
vocational preparation and experience. The point system had a striking impact on the
skill composition of the immigrants entering Canada relative to the skill composition of
US immigrants. In the early 1960s, the typical immigrant who entered Canada had less
schooling that the typical immigrant who entered the US. By the late 1970s, the situation
has reversed and the difference in schooling was in favor of the Canadian immigrant who
had nearly a year more of schooling than the American one (see Borjas, 1993, and Baker
6For nice overviews, see Bodvarsson and van den Berg (2009) and Pekkala Kerr and Kerr (2011)
7See, e.g., Peri (2007), Cortes (2008), and Borjas et al. (2008), Ottaviano and Peri (2011).
26and Benjamin, 1994).
Costly signalling
Diminishing the informational asymmetries faced by northern ﬁrms is one way to
increase the skill composition of migrants. This can be done by letting the private sector
develop a signalling activity that helps employers identify the skills of migrants. Suppose
that, in addition to the school record, high-skilled workers can perfectly signal their skill
at a cost s. The setting we consider here is the one developped in section 4. We shall as-
sume that the cost of signalling is the same for all workers in the South. By incurring this
cost s in addition to the migration cost c, high-skilled workers can guarantee that they
will be paid  wH by northern ﬁrms because they will not be pooled with low-skilled
workers. Provided s <  wH   wH, this possibility rules out the high-discrimination
equilibrium. This is so because some high-skilled workers prefer to pay the signalling
cost and migrate rather than stay in their home country. Thus the high-discrimination
equilibrium is replaced by an equilibrium with signalling in which the same number of
low skill workers migrate and ( wH   s   wH)= c high-skilled workers migrate, signal
themselves and are paid the same wage as their native counterparts. This equilibrium
with signalling entails a better skill composition of migrants than the high-discrimination
equilibrium. When the equilibrium wages w
+
M identiﬁed when there is no signalling op-
portunity are such that  wH   s > w
+
M, low-discrimination equilibria are also ruled out
and replaced by the equilibrium with signalling described above which is the only equi-
librium of the game. In the equilibrium with signalling, high-skilled workers propsects
are increased while low-skilled workers prospects are decreased, thus the skill composi-
tionofmigrantsisimproved. When wH s < w
+
M however, thesignallingoppportunity
does not inﬂuence the behavior of high-skilled workers that anticipate the equilibrium
wage w
+
M. The low discrimination equilibrium stays an equilibrium issue of the game
with signalling. In this case, the signalling opportunity does not change the skill compo-
sition of migrants.
Tax on low-skilled jobs
There is no reason to assume that the regulator in the North is better informed than
the ﬁrms about the skills of the migrants. Therefore, in order to discourage low-skilled
migration and increase the skill composition of migrants, directly taxing low-skilled mi-
grants is impossible. One indirect possibility consists in taxing migrants with a negative
27school record or equivalently in our model, taxing ﬁrms that employ migrants with a neg-
ative school record. Suppose the regulator in the North imposes a tax t on migrants with
a negative school record. We can replicate the analysis conducted in section 4 as follows.




M = (wL   t) + (1   )w
+
M:
The threshold cost c  that is relevant for low-skilled workers becomes
c
  = (1   )w
+
M + (wL   t)   wL:
This threshold is decreasing in t for a ﬁxed w
+
M which implies that the function (w
+
M)
increases as t increases because the convex combination that deﬁnes (w
+
M) puts more
weight on the highest productivity as t increases. By an argument similar to the one used
to prove Lemma 3, we deduce that the equilibrium wage of migrants with a positive
school record in the stable low-discrimination equilibrium is increasing with t and so is
the equilibrium proportion of high-to-low skill immigrants.
No discrimination policy
SupposethattheregulatorintheNorthtriestoincreasethepropspectivewageofhigh-
skilled workers in the South contemplating migration by enforcing a no-discrimination
policy. According to this policy, ﬁrms in the North shall not pay high-skilled migrants a
wage different from  wH, the wage of their native counterparts. When  < 1, the strik-
ing effect of this policy is to make high-skilled workers migration less attractive. The only
equilibrium situation that remains is the high-disrimination outcome where migrants are
only offered low-skilled jobs. Competitive ﬁrms cannot offer high-skilled jobs to migrants
that have a positive school record because their productivity is strictly less than  wH
(when  < 1, the pool of migrants with a positive school record contains low-skilled
workers) and the ﬁrms cannot afford to pay them  wH. Therefore competitive ﬁrms
offer low-skilled jobs to all migrants which decreases the expected wage of high-skilled
migrants.
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32APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Deﬁne P(M j J); J 2 fH;Lg, as the probability that a randomly chosen worker








P(+ j L)P(L) + P(+ j H)P(H)
Next, observe that P(+ j L) = c (1   ). Also, P(+ j H) = c+ as all high-skilled
workers pass the foreign screening test. Finally, recall that P(H) = 1    and P(L) = :
Combining these expressions, it is immediate to obtain the probabilities P(H j +) and
P(L j +) as in the ﬁrst part of the Lemma.
(ii) Since workers are paid the expected wage conditional on observables, then
w
+
M = P(H j 
+) wH + P(L j 
+)wL
Using the expressions above, one gets immediately w
+
M as in the Lemma.
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is increasing and concave in this range.
Proof of Proposition 1
We start by proving that, if  is sufﬁciently large, then a low-discrimination equilib-














= 0). In particular,  ( wH) =  wH, imply-












is also a continuous function of .
Hence, as  ! 1,  ( wH) !  wH and 0 ( wH) ! 0 (implying, in particular, that
330 ( wH) < 1 in a neighborhood of  = 1). Therefore, there exists " 2 (0;wH) such that
 wH  " =  ( wH   "), and w
+
M =  wH  " is a low-discrimination equilibrium wage.
Next, we prove that a high-discrimination equilibrium exists if and only if  
wH=wL. A high-discrimination equilibrium must feature w
+
M = wL. This is sustained by
the belief that P(+ j H) = 0, implying that P(H j +) = 0; P(L j +) = 1: In order
for this belief to be rational, no Southern worker with a positive record must have an
incentive to migrate, i.e., wH  w
+
M. This condition holds if and only if wH  wL. Finally,
some workers with a negative score must have an incentive to migrate. This is always the
case, as wL < wL. This proves that a high-discrimination equilibrium exists if and only
if   wH=wL.
We continue the proof according to the numbering in the Proposition.
1. First, note that, for any  < 1,  ( wH) <  wH: Next, observe that  > wH=wL














and concave for all w
+
M > wH; then the equilibrium is unique. Part 1 of the Proposi-
tion is, therefore established.
2. Consider, next, the range where  > wH=wL: Assume  = 0, and recall that  () is
strictly increasing in  in the range w
+
M 2 [wH; wH]: Then, if a low-discrimination
equilibrium exists for  = 0, such equilibrium also exists for all positive ’s. More
formally, alow-discriminationequilibrium, given = 0, existsiffthereexistsvalue(s)
of w
+
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) wH + (w
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Multiplying both sides of this expression by the denominator of the right-hand side
yields the following quadratic equation
w
+2











The roots of (17) are real if and only if










34This inequality holds if either
  <
wH (1 + )   wL (1 + )   2
p





wH (1 + )   wL (1 + ) + 2
p
 (wH   wL)(wH   wL)
(1   )wH
= ()
The range   <  1 can, however, be ruled out, since it implies that both roots (in w
+
M)
of (17) are smaller than wH: Thus, no low-discrimination equilibrium exists for  = 0
if   <  1: A low discrimination equilibrium (under the assumption that  > wH=wL)
therefore exists for  = 0 (and, a fortiori, for any  > 0) iff   > ().
3. Finally, consider the range where  > wH=wL and   < (). Then, part 2 of the
proposition established that no low-discrimination equilibrium exists for  = 0.
However, we know that a low-discrimination equilibrium exists for  = 1. More-
over,  () is continuously increasing and concave in  in the range w
+
M 2 [wH; wH]:
Thus, a unique low-discrimination equilibrium exists.
Stability in our setting refers to the properties of the tˆ atonnement process where migra-
tion decisions adjust to wages and wages in turn adjust to migration decisions. An equi-
librium is stable in our game when 0(w
+
M) < 1 or when the function () crosses the
diagonal from above. An equilibrium is unstable when 0(w
+
M) > 1 or when the func-
tion () crosses the diagonal from below. Stability properties of the different equilibria as
mentionned in the proposition are straightforward to check.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose the migration of high-skilled workers is such that a number c+= c decided
to migrate. The simultaneous migration decision of low-skilled workers will result in a
wage w
+
M(c+) for those who pass the screening test. The equilibrium condition for the








M   wL) + wL(   1)
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wL








where the left-hand side is the expected productivity of a migrant who passed the test,
when low-skilled workers in the South expect such a wage to be w
+
M. It is easy to see that
35the right-hand side is decreasing in w
+
M so that there exists a unique equilibrium value for
w
+
M(c+). This shows the ﬁrst point in the Proposition.
Next we show that the equilibrium value w
+
M(c+) is an increasing function of c+. Sup-
pose not. This means that increasing the number of high-skilled workers decreases the
expected productivity of a migrant who passed the test. This, in turn, means that an in-
crease in the number of high-skilled migrants unambiguously increases the number of
low-skilled migrants. However, a lower w
+
M must induce a lower number of low-skilled
migrants since it decreases the prospects of low-skilled workers : a contradiction. There-
fore we know that w
+
M(c+) is an increasing function and the game played by the high-
skilled workers in the ﬁrst stage is a game with strategic complementarities.
Finally, because our setting is one with a continuum of players, no worker has an in-
ﬂuence on aggregate variables such as the expected productivity of migrants. Therefore,
playing ﬁrst does not give any advantage to the high-skilled workers.




equilibrium are obtained by studying the function (w
+
M) given by equation (3). At this
equilibrium, the function () veriﬁes locally
(x)  x , x  w
+
M:
Therefore it is sufﬁcient to show that, for a ﬁxed w, (w) is increasing (resp. decreasing)
in a parameter to prove that w
+
M is increasing (resp. decreasing) in that parameter.























It is straightforward to show that the function () is increasing with  . It is decreasing
with  because  wH  wL and increasing  gives more weight to  wH in the convex
combination that deﬁnes (). By the same token, and because w
+
M  wL, increasing 
lowers the weight attributed to wL in the convex combination and therefore increases .




M   wH)(1   ) wH
(w
+




M   wL) + (   1)wL

(1   )
36is increasing in  when (1   )(w
+
M   wL)   wL > 0. Because we know that w
+
M  wL,
we can deduce that (w
+
M) is increasing with  when (1   ) > 1.8
8Of course, the equilibrium value of w
+
M solves a quadratic equation and can be computed analytically. It
is therefore possible to ﬁnd the necessary and sufﬁcient condition on the parameters for w
+
M to be increasing
with  in the stable low-discrimination equilibrium. However, the interpretation of this condition would be
difﬁcult and would involve too many parameters. For simplicity we prefer the simpler sufﬁcient condition
found above.
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Figure 1: The case of large productivity differences between N and S (large λ)
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Figure 3: The case of low productivity differences between N and S (small λ) with ψ > φ (λ)
1 0 < <σ 
Figure 4: Impact of β, the initial proportion of low-skilled workers in the South,  
on native wages in the North (dash curve: 
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Figure 5: Impact of γ, the initial proportion of low-skilled workers in the North,  
on native wages in the North (dash curve: 
*
















Figure 6: Impact of σ, the quality of information on migrants’ skills, on high-skilled (upper 
panel) and low-skilled (lower panel) native wages in the North 
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